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MORE FUNCTIONAL NONSENSE-A REPLY TO
FELIX S. COHEN
WALTER B. KENNEDYt

Once upon a time there lived a dear, dear lady. She was born
many, many centuries ago and lived happily with her childrcn
until some naughty men came to live near the edge of the
forest. The naughty men frightened the children and told
them that the lovely lady was going to die. The story about
to be unfolded will tell you all about the dear lady, her children,
her house and the naughty men.
OuR LADY THE COMMON LAW

T HE S are trying times for those who pay court to "Our Lady the
Common Law" and picture her as a militant figure, possessing
vigor and longevity, with a genius and capacity for adoption and absorption of change and custom, albeit somewhat tardily.' Her admirers
believe with the faith of the true lover that her long reign did not just
happen and that her antiquity somehow gives evidence of her ability
to survive the perils of the present, as well as proof that her constitution
is organically sound, even though she is not immune from the ailments
of human-kind. It is not pleasant to be advised by the internes and
orderlies of the Hospital of Functionalism that not only is the dear Lady
of the Common Law no longer young, charming and vivacious, but, sad
to report, that she is suffering from legal astigmatism and hardening
of the juristic arteries; that "the last long-drawn-out gasp of a dying
tradition"' is already echoing from the operating-room and that the
Lady will soon be but a memory of yesteryears.
Realizing the danger of the patient's condition and the impermanence of worldly existence, the admirers of Our Lady of the Law
anxiously ask for a consultation with the leading legal diagnosticians
and juridical doctors in the despairing hope that their wide skill and
experience, coupled with their intimate knowledge of the Lady's past
illnesses, may be of some aid in this critical moment. The curt retort
is made that such venerable "doctors" as Williston, Wigmore and Beale
have been dismissed from the staff, that their methods of treating the
elderly Lady of the Law have been outmoded, and that outside specialists are in charge of the case-which is at best a hopeless one.
?

Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.

The italics throughout this paper, for the most part, have been inserted by the present
writer.
1. POLLOCk:, THE Gu ,us or THE Co:LoN LAw (1912).
2. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (1935) 35 Cor. L.
REv. 809, 833.

3. Ibid.
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Not only is the Lady of the Common Law in dire distress, but her
dwelling place is sadly in need of repair and reformation. With that
sweet complacency of the lawyer-class, long accustomed to ruthless
criticism, the elder generation has been standing by while juvenile jurists
have been playing havoc with the old homestead of the law and breaking
up juristic toys fabricated by their parents-in-the-law. Their seniors
have hoped that the flare of flaming youth would subside under the
mellowing influences of age and experience and that the sophomoric
smash-everything-in-sight playfulness would be relegated to the attic
along with other boyhood pranks. Even the classics were invoked to
stay the destructive fingers of youth:
"The youth, when Nature and Art attract him, thinks that with a vigorous
effort he can soon penetrate into the innermost sanctuary; the man, after
long wanderings, finds himself in the outer court." 4
But alas! The policy of watchful waiting has been a failure. Of
late the bedlam has increased and junior jurisprudence has been loudly
declaiming against the inheritance of the common law, its logic, mysticism and verbalism. 5 The irksome restraints and prohibitions, imposed by the five, seven or "nine old men"" of our appellate courts
fumbling around among "precedents," "cases" and "authorities" of the
ox-cart age, must be implemented by televisioned, electronic, radiocontrolled devices which will permit the controversies of mankind to
be settled with slot machine accuracy and speed. What to do about
this uprising is a matter of grave doubt and debate. Some argue for
a conspiracy of silence on the ground that radical reformers seeking to
undermine the old tradition are still groping around in the shadows of
the sub-cellar and have not yet seen the light of day. Others prescribe
a trip to the juristic woodshed and the application of a verbal
spanking in the hope that the shock might quell the rebellion. A
compromise course between these contrasted policies of silence and
of the application of force may be preferable. Why not consider
some of the more fantastic proposals of the problem-children of
our generation? Perhaps, seeing the erxor of their ways, the prodigal sons of functionalism and realism may return to the old mansion of the law. If so, all will be forgiven. More than that, we can
assure them a reasonable degree of freedom within the household of
the law, a fair opportunity to experiment and even to alter the existing
legal structure. Our main worry at the moment is that the reformers
will insist upon pulling down the rose covered cottage of the common
4.
5.

Von Goethe, Introduction to the Propylaen, 39 HARvARD CLAssics 264.
Kennedy, Functional Nonsense and the Transcendental Approach (1936) 5 FoRwuHjAiU

L. REV. 272.

6.

PEARSON AND ALLEN, NiNE OLD MEN

(1936).
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law and offering us a "blueprint" of modernistic design in its place.
While conceding the advantages of modernizing the old homestead by
installing a "sunken" living-room, the fear subsists that the "lowering
process" will extend to the entire legal edifice.
The leaders of functional thought have set down very clearly some
of the institutions and agencies which are destined to bring about the
New Order in the law. One thing has been made crystal-clear: The lawyer
is deemed to be incapable of cleaning his own house; associate counsel
from without the gates are to be employed; a new technique has been
devised with processes and methods wholly divorced from concept-ridden
transcendentalism. Great reliance is placed on the utility and benefits
to be derived from such positive sciences as economics or psychology.'
We are confidently informed that "every major legal problem will soon
be worked over in terms of the psychology of today." 8 Again, it is
stated that "fundamental postulates and methods which underlie experimental physical science are capable of application in the field of
juristic science."9
In a recent article, I attempted to reproduce and to comment upon
certain of these extreme proposals to reform the law. The reproduction
disclosed a determined drive to revolutionize the legal order, a sustained
assault upon the citadels of the common law, an amazing assertion that
outstanding legal scholars are definitely outmoded, 10 an ouster of the
ivy-covered concepts of the "gay nineties,"" a debunking of the rules
and principles,' 2 a violent attack against the horse-and-buggy era of
jurisprudence and a warm welcome to the "eight cylinder social machine"
ready to go places under the direction of functional engineers and realist
reformers.
A REPLY TO FELLX S. COHEN
Following the publication of my paper, Felix S. Cohen wrote a reply
letter in the November issue of the Foinmii
LAW RmmTwE.
In his
letter Mr. Cohen takes me to task for certain statements which I made
regarding his article, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
7. Cohen, supra note 2, at 821: "Jurisprudence, then, as an autonomous system of
legal concepts, rules, and arguments, must be independent both of ethics and of suchl
positive sciences as economics or psychology.' (Italics inserted.)
8. RoBINsoN, LAW AiD LAwyrEs (1936) 50. For a criticism of Robinson, see Goodrich, Institute Bards and Yale Reviewers (1936) 84 U. or PA. L. R.sv. 449, 451; see also
Arnold, Institute Priests and Yale Observers (1936) 84 U. or PA. L. RE%. 811.
9. Beutel, Some Implications of Experimental Jurisprudence (1934) 48 H,%nv. L. R%,.
169, 172.

10. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 285.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 275.
Id. at 283.
Cohen, Correspondence (1936)

5 FoDmTAx* L.

ry. 548.
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Approach."' 4 "Six ideas," he charges, I erroneously ascribe to himall of which he definitely repudiates. Were a verbal sparring-match
between Mr. Cohen and myself alone at stake, our differences of opinion
and interpretation might be allowed to smother and die, "a happy
ending"-I suspect, many of our readers might exclaim-to the entire
discussion about Nonsense, Functional, Transcendental or Plain, in
which we are now immersed. However, in view of the fact that my
censor invented the suggestive title, TranscendentalNonsense, and ingeniously applied it to describe the "heaven" of legal concepts which houses
the senseless, legal thinking of our courts, I may be permitted the
privilege of a reply-brief in defense of the thesis that, functionalism
is at least a joint-tenant in the same House of Nonsense; and, is
betraying evidences of meriting the sole right of survivorship.
Before beginning the analysis of Mr. Cohen's letter, let us get rid of
the personal equation at once. I gathered the impression that my objector was slightly vexed by the statements of his "gentle critic"'1 and
by his lively "imagination."'" If so, I am sorry. True, I was not the
"gentle critic" in dealing with his brand of functionalism, but Mr.
Cohen's article'" could hardly be characterized as a bed-time lullaby
in its farewell to dear, old jurisprudence and some of its most distinguished followers. Yet I liked his freshness of approach, his scholarship and his courage.
I am sure that liberal legal scholars-who are having such fun with
the five, seven or "nine old men"' of the appellate courts of the law,
their "conceptual gymnastics" and their blindness to "reliable technique"--will concede to the Old Order the same privilege of an indulging
in an occasional flash of humor, however forced and stale it may be, in
defense of the "dying" tradition! There is ample precedent 0 (which,
of course, the conceptualist must have) for an occasional bit of playfulness. Moreover, the whole controversy between the conservatives and
the progressives in the law is at best dreadfully dry and dismal. To the
modernists must go the credit for lifting legal literature out of the
dry-as-dust doldrums and adding a new "punch" which has enhanced
the reader-interest. A sense of humor, which ofttimes pervades the
writings of the functionalists, is also helpful in the consideration of
14. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (1935) 35 COL. L.
REv. 809.
15. Cohen, supra note 13, at 549.
16. Ibid.
17. Note 14, supra.
18. Note 6, supra.
19. If precedent is asked for a touch of humor to soften the ponderous paragraphs of
jurisprudence, Cardozo concedes that a modicum of mirth is permissible. CARmozo, LAW
AND LrrERATURE. (1931) 26-30. See Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews (1936) 23 VA. L.
REV. 38.
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some of their proposals; it acts as a soothing sedative in the endeavor
to detect the prudence in their brand of jurisprudence.
In this spirit of professional camaraderie (and not too seriously) I
should like to discuss the reply-letter of Felix S. Cohen. I repeat that
I reopen the involved issues solely because I believe that the errors in his
position, both in his original article and in his reply, are typical of the
more advanced thinkers of the school of juristic thought to which he
adheres. I further believe that these errors, if widely adopted in the
law, would be harmful and a discussion may be of some benefit to the
legal profession.
It has been my contention that functional jurisprudence, despite its
alleged devotion to facts, figures, charts, statistical curves and tape
measures is more empty, airy, elusive and impractical than the legal
concepts, principles, precedents and rules which have been the targets
for the functional sharpshooters; that there is a lot of "nonsense" bearing the stamp of science which is being peddled about by the traders in
the fact-approach; 2 0 that this "reliable technique" 2' never gets close
enough to legal problems to be of any value; that when it does "apthe given problem, offers a few generalizations
proach" it walks 2around
2
and then departs.
My attention was directed to Mr. Cohen's paper,' because it discussed
cases, actual cases, and criticised them in terms of functionalism. He
also attempted to show how the functionalists (or some of them) would
have dealt with these controversies. Due commendation was paid to
him for discussing cases 24 rather than the drug store as an institution or
the home life of Nebraska farmers.2 To me it seemed that his specific
treatment offered an ideal "proving ground" to test out the comparative
values of the "old" and the "new" ways of handling legal problems.
His wide knowledge of law and the social sciences made it evident that
functionalism was in the hands of competent counsel.
Let us now turn to the "six ideas" which, it is charged, I erroneously
ascribed to Felix S. Cohen in his paper.
To "See" or Not to "See"?
(1). The first idea for which he declines "all responsibility" and
which I "erroneously ascribed" to him is: "that a corporation is not
20. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 274-251.
21. Cohen, supa note 13, at 551.

22. For examples of this tendency among functional writers, see Cohen, supra note
14, at
23.
24.
25.

810, 813, 817.
Note 14, sura.
Kennedy, supra note 5, at 237.
For a humorous estimate of functionalism by law students see (1935)

LAw Juamm

CoLuamu
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because it cannot be seen." 6 He says he "never said that or anything
like it." What did Mr. Cohen say?
I quote from his article in the Columbia Law Review:
"Nobody has ever seen a corporation. What right have we to believe in
27
corporations if we don't believe in angels?"1
And later, he says:
"Legal concepts (for example, corporations or property rights) are supernatural entities which do not have a verifiable existence except to the eyes of
faith."7
A writer, who questions the right to "believe" in "corporations" if we
don't believe in "angels," who classifies them as "supernatural entities"
which have no "verifiable existence" except to "eyes of faith," cannot
be too harsh on the reader who concludes that he means what he says.
The difficulty with Mr. Cohen is that he wants to abolish the corporation
concept and at the same time to keep it. A difficult task even under the
flexible formulas of realistic jurisprudence. Compare the above quotation with his recent letter. In his letter he now concedes that the corporation which had no "verifiable existence" is a "reality." 2 8 That which
was a "supernatural entity" is now a "bundle of legal relations.1 2 The
corporation (which his article in the Columbia Law Review contended
had no "verifiable existence" except to the "eyes of faith") can now
be "seen" by the eyes of the faithful functionalist, for it would be
"stupid" of Mr. Cohen, as he frankly concedes,"0 "to deny the reality of
corporations" which he helped to organize.
Two points more, in concluding the first "idea": let me recall that
his letter did not first reveal his attempt to reject the corporation concept
and also to retain it. Attention was directed to the same nimble straddle
in his article when he criticized Judge Cardozo for "seeing" a foreign
corporation, and yet allowed his "competent legislature" to "see" and
to deal with the same foreign corporation. 3 ' But the main issue arising
out of foreign corporations is completely ignored by Mr. Cohen. That
issue is not, whether a corporation can be "seen," or whether it is a
"human being," or whether it can "travel" from state to state as mortal
men travel. The issue is whether Judge Cardozo and the New York
Court of Appeals were guilty of uttering words of nonsense when they
26.
27.
27a.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Cohen, supra note 13, at 548.
Cohen, supra note 14, at 811. (Italics inserted, in part.)
Id. at 821.
Cohen, supra note 13, at 548.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 548.
Kennedy, supra note 5, at 289-291.
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permitted a foreign corporation to be sued in New York.32 I claim that
Judge Cardozo was not interested in the manner in which the foreign
corporation arrived in New York, whether by flight of plane, flight of
imagination, or horse and buggy. Our point of emphasis was that the
foreign corporation dealt with in the Tauza case was doing business in
New York and should be subjected to the process of the New York
Courts.' Instead of dealing with the corporation as a "reality" (as 4Mr.
Cohen now does) he centered his attack upon one single sentenceP of
Judge Cardozo's opinion, and ignored the balance of the opinion. It is
submitted that a reading of my worthy opponent's critique of the Tauza
case leaves the impression that Judge Cardozo was juggling a supernatural entity on the end of his pen, sketching out and "thingifying" a
pure abstraction, and utterly ignoring the social, political and practical
problems of the given question, namely, the suability of a foreign corporation in New York. The crux of the issue between Mr. Cohen and
myself was stated as follows:
"To charge that the New York Court of Appeals reached its decision as to
the suability of a foreign corporation without addressing itself 'to the economic,
sociological, political or ethical questions' is to ignore the history and flux of
precedents leading up to and latent in the Tauza case. Tauza v. Susquethanna
Coal Co. is but a link in the chain of decisions, a chain whose links have been
forged and hammered, altered and removed from time to time.

'3

5

And again, it was said:
"The general charge made by Cohen that the basic question of the Tauza
case, where is a corporation? prevents the consideration of non-legal data, is
clearly not substantiated by a reference to the leading cases on the subject."3 0
32. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 91S (1917); Cohen,
supra note 14, at 810-811; Kennedy, supra note 5,at 286-296.
33. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 286-296.
34. The sentence lifted out of Judge Cardozo's opinion was the following: "The e:ential thing is that the corporation shall have come into the state." Cohen, supra note 14,
at 811.
What did Judge Cardozo mean when he said that it is esential that the corporation
shall have come into the state? Was he really suggesting (or inferring) that a corporation "travelled" about from state to state as mortal men travel? The real meaning of the
above quoted sentence is not a matter of conjecture. Judge Cardozo said: "Unlers a
foreign corporation is engaged in business within the statei it is not brought within the
state by the presence of its agents. But there is no precise test of the nature or exlenr of
the business that must be done. All that is requisite is that enough be dore to enable
us to say that the corporation is here" Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., supra note 32,
at 26S. A reading of the complete opinion in the Tauza case discloses that the "doing of
business," systematically and regularly, is the fact which spells out jurisdiction over the
foreign corporation, and it was "the established course of business" which brought it into
New York.
35. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 292.
36. Id. at 294.
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Instead of the broader issue raised, Mr. Cohen prefers to debate the
question of whether he said that a "a corporationis not because it cannot
be seen."
To sum up, our critic of the corporation in his article used rather definite language which carried the reasonable inference that the corporation
was a "supernatural entity" without "verifiable existence" and visible only
"to eyes of faith." In his letter he takes a juristic nose-dive from the
heaven of legal concepts and concedes that a corporation has "reality"
and is a "bundle of legal relationships between actual human beings."
His "corporation" has parted company with the "angels" at least, and is
now dwelling with "actual human beings." But before the "descent"
first set down in his letter, his reader's gaze was directed to the heaven
of abstractions, which "nobody has ever seen." I suspect that Mr.
Cohen went once too often to the "heaven of legal concepts" for the
purpose of fixing the domicile of corporations; now that he is back on
solid earth again, all is well.
Functionalism and the Courts
(2). The second "idea" to which Mr. Cohen takes exception is my
statement that he was using rather vigorous language in criticising
prominent judges and attorneys because of their use of "transcendental
nonsense" in their opinions and briefs.8 7 Nowhere, he contends, does
he attack these men for their unreal questions and meaningless statements. On the contrary his alleged attack is a product of his gentle
critic's "imagination." Analysis may disclose that his strong criticism of the courts, which he localizes in my "imagination," has a dual
situs (if I may inject another "unreality" of conceptual thinking). To
prove that all is "sweetness and light" in his relations to the transcendental jurists, he quotes from his article as follows:
"Of course, it would be captious to criticise courts for delivering their opinions
in the language of transcendental nonsense... Certain words and phrases are
useful for the purpose of releasing pent-up emotions, or putting babies to sleep,
or inducing certain emotions and attitudes in a political or a judicial audience.
The law is not a science but a special activity, and myths may impress the
imaginationand memory where more exact discourse would leave minds cold."' 38
Somehow the reader of the quotation gathers the faint suspicion that
this confession of the utility of "transcendental nonsense" is not wholly
complimentary. The admission that such words and phrases are alike
useful in the nursery and in the opinions of the courts for the purpose of
inducing emotions and attitudes and arousing imagination and memory
37. Cohen, supra note 13, at 549.
38.

Ibid.
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seems to be, at best, a luke-warm indorsement of "transcendental nonsense" in judicial utterances.
The passage which follows in his article (which is not quoted in Mr.
Cohen's letter) will complete his estimate of the usefulness of couching
judicial opinions in the language of Bo-Peep and Little Jack Homer:
"Valuable as is the language of transcendental nonsense for many practical
legal purposes, it is entirely useless when we come to study, describe, predict,
and criticise legal phenomena. And although judges and lawyers need not be
legal scientists, it is of some practical importance that they should recognize
that the traditional language of argument and opinion ncithcr exp!ains nor
jstifies court decisions." 39
While the writer states that "of course, it would be captious to criticise
courts for delivering their opinions in the language of transcendental
nonsense," it is feared, after reading the additional passage, that he
"went and done it!" Is it not permissible for a commentator to conclude
that Mr. Cohen was striking at the foundation of judicial decisions
when he says that the traditional methods do not justify or explain these
decisions and that the customary language used by our courts (the
language he terms transcendental nonsense) is entirely useless for purposes of the study, description, prediction or criticism of legal
phenomena?
Let the exact issue between Mr. Cohen and myself on this point be
repeated. The question is not whether he is right or wrong in his plea
for reformation of law. It is much more confined. The query is: Is Mr.
Cohen criticizing the courts and their manner of deciding cases?
Continuing Mr. Cohen's dissent to my assumption that he was finding
fault in material degree with the manner in which our leading jurists are
deciding cases, he says that he was merely analyzing certain aspects of
legal reasoning in the opinions of "the most intelligent judges in
True, he referred to Justices Cardozo and Brandeis as
America."4
"the most intelligent judges in America,"' but I fear that Mr. Cohen
was taking that remark "out of context." Let us reproduce the entire
passage in which the quotation appears:
"Thus it is that the most intelligent judgcs in Aincrica [Justices Cardozo and
Brandeis] can deal with a concrete practical problem of procedural law and
corporate responsibility without any appreciationof tho economic, social, and
ethical issues which it involves."2

There are certain statements which are so patently exaggerated that
39. Cohen, supra note 14, at 812.
40. Cohen, supra note 13, at 549.
41. Id. at 549.
42. Cohen, supra note 14, at 812.
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further comment thereon is a waste of time. I submit that the foregoing
quotation accusing Justices Cardozo and Brandeis of deciding a concrete
problem of procedural law "without any appreciation of the economic,
social and ethical issues which it involves," is of that calibre and I
further say that the complimentary part of the sentence, quoted out of
context in his letter, fades away considerably when the complete sentence
is read. I am afraid that we shall have to insist, beyond and outside of
my "imagination," that the critic was using some pretty strong language
anent the manner in which Justices Brandeis and Cardozo handled the
cases in question. However Mr. Cohen's letter is much milder. He now
says:
"Inthe opinions of Justice Cardozo and others of his stature, these [unreal
questions and meaningless statements] are evidences
of weakness in the system
43
of legal reasoning by which our judges are bound.1

Softer in tone, however untrue in substancel
Mr. Cohen also objects44 to my statement that he "bitterly" condemned
the manner in which Judge Cardozo decided Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal
Company." A reading of his article, I think, justifies my remark. For
two pages he takes the New York Court of Appeals and Judge Cardozo
to task for the manner in which they decided the Tauza case. 40 He
points out that "terms of transcendental nonsense" are present in the
decision and implies that those who approach a legal problem in these
supernatural terms are qualifying "as inmates of Von Jhering's heaven of
legal concepts." And if the reader is interested, it might be added, that
the "inmates" of the aforesaid heaven, so graphically described by Mr.
Cohen,4 7 do not seem to be "jurists" with whom Justice Cardozo and his
associates would like to be confined. On rereading the caustic comment
about the manner in which the Tauza case was decided by Judge Cardozo,
I marvel at the temperance of language which I used to describe his
criticism.4" Mr. Cohen also finds fault with his "gentle critic" because
said critic accused him of "attacking" the brief of Mr. Hughes in the
Coronado case49 and "scolding" counsel for not building their brief about
functions and handicaps, omitting or minimizing legal principles.50 Not
to prolong the dispute, the "attack" directed against the brief of Mr.
Hughes in the Coronado case will be found in the following language:
43. Cohen, supra note 13, at 549-550.
44. Id. at 549.
45. Note 34, supra.
46. Cohen, supra note 14, at 810-811.
47. Id. at 809.
48. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 286-294.
49. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922).
50. Cohen, supra note 13, at 549. For my treatment of the Coronado case see
note 5, at 295-300.

supra
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"So far as appears from the printed record, counsel for the union defendants
did not attempt to show that labor unions would be seriously handicapped by
the imposition of financial responsibility for damage done in strikes, that it
would be impossible for labor unions to control agents provocateurs, and that
labor unions served a very important function in modem industrial society
which would be seriously endangered by the type of liability in question.
Instead of offering any such argument to support the claim of the labor union
to legal immunity for the torts of its members, counsel for the union advanced
the metaphysical argument that a labor union, being an unincorporated association, is not a person and, therefore, cannot be subject to tort liability."51
I think that the term, attack, is not too violent a word to apply to
Mr. Cohen's analysis. Incidentally, I also stated (and this also he
denies 2 ) that Mr. Cohen volunteered a bit of "instruction" to the Supreme Court concerning the "reliable technique" of functionalism, and
showed how the Supreme Court ought to have phrased an essential part
of the decision in the Coronado case;53 and finally, I suggested that the
aforesaid decision contained plenty of functional material which Mr.
Cohen apparently was unable to see because of his concerted attack
4
upon the unfortunate and regrettable use of conceptual language.
Two More "Ideas"

(3).

We may combine two of Mr. Cohen's criticisms (numbered 3

and 655) and deal with them under one caption. He objects to the claim
that he is an adherent to the cult of the single decision, i.e., the cult which
abhors rules and principles and holds fast to facts and functions. This
point need not long detain us. Any writer who advocates in one article
the abandonment of the concepts of property, corporation, title, due

process, contract and 'police power on the ground that they are bankrupt,
supernatural terms"0 can hardly object when his reader concludes that
he is not an ardent advocate of rules or principles. Even a casual
reading of his article will disclose that he is very enthusiastic about nonlegal materials and their great value in the evaluation of legal problems.
He is very insisteift that the courts should use this material although
he is not clear as to where the material is to be found. Indeed, so
critical is he of the lack of fact-finding in the Supreme Court that he
concludes that this technique, which was used in the brief of Mr.
Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon,"7 found less favor in subsequent cases in
51. Cohen, supra note 14, at 813.
52. Cohen, supra note 13, at 549
53. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 297-298.
54. Id. at 293-299.
55. Cohen, spra note 13, at 550-551.
56. Cohen, supra note 14, at 820, 823, 833.
57. 203 U. S. 412, 419 (1908).
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the eyes of the courts. 8 In proof of the collapse of the fact-finding
brief, he points to the lonesome case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital,"
decided thirteen years ago, and omits completely more recent decisions
which have recognized and applied the fact approach.;0 One may not
be criticised for inferring that Mr. Cohen is a devotee of facts, lots of
facts, although just what is to be done after their collection is still to be
determined.
But Mr. Cohen chides me for spending thirteen pages on the discussion
of two cases (Tauza and Coronado cases)." True, too true. If Mr.
Cohen will reread the thirteen pages,62 he will find that they were used
in the attempt to prove that the "transcendental nonsense" he extracted
out of these two cases was in fact a principle which had evolved slowly
out of no single case, but was the crystallization of years of painful development which, strange to say, included an adequate coverage of the
"economic, sociological and ethical questions" which my adversary so
frequently stresses.
In a humble way, I was "probing behind the decision to the forces
which it reflects" 3 -a part of his own formula which was strangely lacking in his zeal to pull out of Judge Cardozo's opinion in the Tauza case
a single sentence6 4 and put it under the microscope of functionalism.
"Nonsense" Defined
(4). We now come to the most startling portion of Mr. Cohen's
letter. Herein he criticizes me for ascribing to him the view "that
jurisprudence is nonsense." 5 Regretfully my answer must start with a
correction: I stated that Mr. Cohen maintained that "jurisprudence is
transcendentalnonsense." Let the text of my paper speak for itself:
"With increasing frequency and dogmatic assurance we are informed that
the law is an agglomeration and admixture of transcendental nonsense .... "00
58. Cohen, supra note 14, at 819.
Cf. Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law (1916) 29 HAV.
L. Rxv. 353, for a coverage of cases after Muller v. Oregon, which led Professor Frankfurter to conclude "that the technique of the brief in the Muller case has established
itself through a series of decisions within the last few years, which have caused not only

change in decisions, but the much more vital change in method of approach to constitutional questions." Id. at 365.
59. 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
60. Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 534-536 (1931); Home Building
and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 420-424 (1933); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U. S. 502, 530 (1933) ; Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 210 (1934).
61. Cohen, supra note 13, at 550.

62.

Kennedy, supra note 5, at 287-300.

63. Cohen, supra note 13, at 550.
64. Note 34, supra.
65. Cohen, supra note 13, at 550.
66. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 272.
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In proof of the text statement, I inserted the following passage from Mr.
Cohen's article in the Columbia Law Review:
"Jurisprudence, then, as an autonomous system of legal concepts, rules andT
arguments .. is a special branch of the science of transcendental nonsense."
The additional word "transcendental," it will appear, is a rather important one and should not be deleted from the quotation.
After such correction, does Mr. Cohen deny that he said (or that he
believes) that "jurisprudence is transcendental nonsense"? If so, I
offer his title,6 his section headings,6 9 his many samples of transcendental
nonsense, 70 his express readiness to provide additional examples of such
nonsense, 71 as evidence that a reasonable reader would be warranted in
drawing such a sentiment out of his article. Based upon the foregoing,
I cannot see why Mr. Cohen should claim that the statement (as corrected above) was made "out of context." It seems to me that such
an expression is not only set forth in the quotation from his article, but
indeed, pervades his entire paper.
Regarding Scholastic Logic
(5). Finally, Mr. Cohen labors under the impression that I charged
him with an attack upon scholastic logic. While a material portion of
my article was devoted to his paper there were many parts which were
general in character. The statement which I made regarding scholastic
logic was as follows: "Scholastic logic is the bate noire of the functionalists' attack."72 The issue is not what Mr. Cohen thinks about
scholastic logic (and he concedes its value1 2 ) but whether functionalists
generally look with favor or disfavor on this form of reasoning which
we call scholastic logic.
That there is opposition to the methods of scholastic logic, of syllogistic
reasoning, and of formal logic and that the antagonism issues forth from
the ranks of functionalists and realists has been noted by Goodhart, 4
Harno75 and Adler.7" If a sample of the view of a functionalist is sought
67. Cohen, supra note 14, at 821.
68. Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (1935) 35 CoL. L. Rs-v. S09.
69. A few of his section headings are "The Heaven oE Legal Concepts" (p. 809); "The

Nature of Legal Nonsense" (p. 820); "The Eradication of Mleaningle s Concepts"
(p. 822); and "The Abatement of Meaningless Questions" (p. 823).
70. Id. at 809-821.
71. Id. at 820.
72. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 272, n. 3.
73. Cohen, supra note 13, at 550.
74. "The second feature of the realist school is its attack on the use of formal logic
,in the law... . GooDnInT, Some American Interpretationsof Law, AfolnUL TXonxos
op LAw (1933)

12.

75. Hano, social Planning and Perspective Through Law (1933) AiL L. ScurooL JIV.
705, 707-710.
76. Adler, Legal Certainty (1931) 31 COL. L. Rrv. 91, 99.
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we recommend the reading of Frank, who deplores the "curse of formal
(i.e. scholastic) logic" 77 and "the slavish adherence of lawyers to that
instrument of reasoning which was worshipped by all men of the Middle
Ages-formal logic."7 8 But Mr. Cohen refers to Oliphant as a defender
of scholastic logic. 9 Rather curiously Frank invokes Oliphant as a
keen critic of scholastic logic,8 " and so also Goodhart selects Oliphant as
an opponent of formal logic. 8 ' Without trying to solve the riddle of
whether Oliphant is a "true lover" of scholastic logic or not, sufficient
appears to make the single authority cited by Mr. Cohen a bit doubtful.
In any event, the foregoing is offered in proof that functionalism and
scholastic logic are not exactly ideal playmates.
In his conclusion, Mr. Cohen makes a general plea for the establishment of a "reliable technique" in the law to observe social conditions.8 '
I hope, at some other time, to consider this matter of "reliable technique"
arising out of, for instance, his mention of "such positive sciences as
economics and psychology."83 A mere glance at these "positive sciences"
and their wrangles, conflicts and confusion makes the lawyer skeptical
about any material aid from such sources. If there is one thing that
discredits functionalism, more than any other, it is its threatening to sell
the law "down the river" to the social scientists in seeming disregard
of current happenings in these bordering disciplines.
Signs point to a gradual recognition that fact-finding has failed to
bring about the promised certainty, understanding and direction to
social policy and program. Modern thought under the guise of the
scientific method is at the crossways. In a devastating chapter 4 Beard
has sketched out the breakdown of scientific procedure in economics, 8
in political science," and insociology.87 Hutchins continues the survey
and ventures the opinion that the reason for the collapse of the scientific
approach is traceable to an utter absence of principle, a freedom of
thought which promised solution of the knotty problems of life-and
instead gave us confusion, chaos and "anarchy." 8 Yet this program of
science, facing revaluation-if not defeat-in its own domains, is offered
77.

FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930)

78.

Id. at 65.

90.

See also ch. VII.

79. Cohen, supra note 13, at 550.
80.
81.

FRANK, op. cit. supra note 77, at 65-66.
GOODHEART, Op. cit. supra note 74, at 12.

82.

Cohen, supra note 13, at 551.

83.

Cohen, supra note 14, at 821.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

BEARD, THE OPEN DooR AT HomE (1935) ch. 2.
Id. at 8-10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12-13.
Hutchins, Unversity Education (1936) 25 YAIE REVIEW 665, passin.
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as the true solution to the vexatious problems of the law. More than
that, the extremists are asking for the substitution of the "scientific
method" in place of the traditional approach of the Common Law.
Our Lady the Common Law Lives On
Once more we turn back to "Our Lady the Common Law." We note
that she gives a slight nod of recognition, a faint smile that promises
convalescence, a semblance of a frown directed to the Doctors of Functionalism who predicted her early demise. But the frown clears away
as quickly as it formed, for this diagnosis of despair is nothing novel in
her long career. With the mellowing influence of years she is ready to
welcome her wayward sons back to the fold. Despite the dire predictions that the dear Lady is not long for this world, the story may end-in
true fairy-tale fashion-with the prophecy that Our Lady the Common
Law will live happily on for many, many years.
"Whatever its defects, the [common-law] system, deep rooted in
our tradition and habit of mind, after serving us for some six centuries, will not be discarded. lit the rdle of critics and prophets we
will do well to accept that as the probable verdict of history! '
89.

Stone, The Common Law in the United States (1936) 50 ] * %. L. R-,'. 4, 7.
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